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"WE ARE ALL HERE TO STAY"; 
ADDRESSING ABORIGINAL TITLE 
CLAIMS AFTER DELGAMUUKW V 
BRITISH COLUMBIA 
Rachel Yurkowski* 
This article outlines how the Canadian courts dealt with the interface between aboriginal title and 
common law notions of property throughout the various Delgamuukw decisions.  Through 
examination of the different judgments in the case, at different judicial levels, the article traverses issues 
around the source of aboriginal title, and subsequent limitations on the content of aboriginal title which 
arise from that.  The article concludes that the unique concept of aboriginal title cannot be interpreted 
within the paradigm of the common law.  The article further concludes that courts are the wrong forum 
for adjudicating aboriginal claims. 
I INTRODUCTION  
In 1984, the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en Indians (the Indians) brought an action against the 
province of British Columbia that after thirteen years, one trial, two appeals and twelve judges 
later, would result in "the most complete account of the law on aboriginal title that has ever 
been attempted by the courts."1  The case was Delgamuukw v British Columbia2 (Delgamuukw). 
  
*  This paper was submitted in fulfilment of the LLB (Hons) requirements at Victoria University in 1999. 
1  Peter W Hogg Recognition of Aboriginal Title <http://romania.saf.yorku.ca/ robarts/ canwatch/ 
vol_6_4,5,6/> (last accessed 24 July 1999). 
2  Delgamuukw v British Columbia (1997) 153 DLR (4th) 194 (SCC) [Delgamuukw (SCC)]. 
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In an attempt to alleviate the confusing case law of recent years,3 the judgment of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Delgamuukw presented a new approach for determining the 
source, nature and content of aboriginal title, its requirements for proof, justifications for its 
infringement, and how and by whom it could be infringed or extinguished. Whether this 
approach will be upheld in future litigation is uncertain. There are significant discrepancies 
and anomalies in the Court's reasoning that may inhibit future claimants having their 
legitimate rights recognised.   
These anomalies are the product of the judicial process, which has proven itself to be an 
unsatisfactory mechanism for determining aboriginal claims. Not only can the "winner takes 
all" approach of the adversarial court process result in damaging and irreversible blows for 
aboriginal groups, but its inflexible rules of evidence and its limited common law jurisdiction 
create restrictions for aboriginal claimants. Significant Commonwealth cases on aboriginal title, 
namely Mabo v Queensland (No 2)4 (Mabo) and Wik Peoples v Queensland5 (Wik) have faced the 
same predicament encountered by the Supreme Court in Delgamuukw. How can the doctrine of 
aboriginal title and its complicated sovereignty and tenure issues be reconciled with the 
general concepts of property at common law?  
These issues suggest that a new approach to aboriginal claims be adopted, one which is not 
confined to the courtroom and can look beyond common law concepts of property law. The 
Supreme Court itself recognised the difficulties it faced and suggested future claims be 
addressed through negotiated settlements or specially created commissions. The author 
suggests these recommendations be strongly heeded, so as to avoid yet another dissatisfying 
denouement for aboriginal claimants.  
As Tom Sampson, Chairman of the First Nations of South Island Tribal Council said of the 
Delgamuukw case:6 
  
3  For example, the Supreme Court took a generous approach to aboriginal rights in R v Sparrow (1990) 70 
DLR (4th) 385, yet retracted from this thinking in the 1996 cases of R v Adams (1996) 138 DLR (4th) 657, R 
v Gladstone (1996) 137 DLR (4th) 648, R v Van Der Peet (1996) 137 DLR (4th) 289, R v NTC Smokehouse 
(1996) 137 DLR (4th) 528 and R v Cote (1996) 138 DLR (4th) 385. 
4  Mabo v State of Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 107 ALR 1. 
5  Wik Peoples v State of Queensland (1996) 141 ALR 129 (HCA).   
6  Tom Sampson in Frank Cassidy (ed) Aboriginal Title in British Columbia: Delgamuukw v The Queen 
(Oolichan Books, Lantzville and the Institute for Research on Public Policy, Montreal, 1992) 61. 
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it is really not the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en people that are on trial. It's Canada and the colonial 
system that is on trial. The justice system is really on trial. 
In the Delgamuukw case, the justice system has lost. 
II BACKGROUND TO THE CASE  
A Common Law Aboriginal Title  
Aboriginal or native title is accepted to arise from the common law presumption that 
indigenous people occupied and controlled the land in accordance with traditional laws and 
customs prior to the introduction of British sovereignty. Upon the introduction of British 
governance by settlement, conquest or cession, the Crown obtains the imperium (radical title) to 
the land by virtue of the doctrine of tenure. This title is burdened by the native inhabitants' 
pre-existing legal right to the land,7 which is deemed to continue under the doctrine of 
continuity.8 The beneficial title (dominium) retained by the aboriginal inhabitants is known as 
"common law aboriginal title." 
Because the Crown has the underlying title to the soil, aboriginal title is not absolute and 
can be infringed or extinguished by the Crown. Earlier judgments have determined that 
aboriginal title can only be infringed in pursuit of a "compelling and substantial objective" and 
with respect for the Crown's fiduciary duty towards indigenous peoples.9 This fiduciary duty 
  
7 Guerin v Canada (1984) 13 DLR (4th) 321 per Dickson CJ. The Judge relied on the Privy Council's 
statements in Amodu Tijani v Secretary, Southern Nigeria [1921] 2 AC 399, that the presumptive title of 
the indigenous inhabitants was based on their system of customary laws which existed prior to the 
cession of that territory to Britain. This was also recognised in Calder v Attorney General of British 
Columbia  (1973) 34 DLR (3d) 145 where Judson J stated "aboriginal rights arise by operation of law, 
and do not depend on a grant from the Crown."   
8  The doctrine of continuity as described by Brian Slattery "Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 
Canadian Bar Review 727, 738, quoted in Delgamuukw (BCCA) per Lambert JA: 
When the Crown gained sovereignty over a territory, colonial law dictated that the local 
customs of the native peoples would presumptively continue in force, and be 
recognisable in the courts, except insofar as they were unconscionable or incompatible 
with the Crown's assertion of sovereignty. In this respect, the rule resembles that applied 
in conquered or ceded colonies, where the local law is held to remain in force in the 
absence of acts to the contrary. But the rule respecting native custom applies regardless of 
whether the territory is deemed to have been acquired by conquest, cession, peaceful settlement, or 
in some other way. (Judge's emphasis) 
9   R v Sparrow above n 3. 
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encompasses the requirements of consent, consultation and compensation.10 Regardless of this 
duty, the Crown can unilaterally extinguish title pursuant to a legislative or executive act with 
a "clear and plain intention" to do so. However, the obligation is upon the Crown to prove that 
aboriginal title has been validly extinguished or infringed. 11 
B Aboriginal Title as a Sui Generis Interest 
Courts in recent years have classified aboriginal title as a sui generis interest,12 and the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed this in Delgamuukw. This was a significant development from earlier 
thoughts suggesting aboriginal title was a "personal and usufructuary"13 right, capable of 
being overridden by a Crown grant of land. However, the ramifications of granting aboriginal 
title a sui generis status are unclear. Is an examination of aboriginal title under common law 
notions of property law totally precluded or must aboriginal title be interpreted and assessed 
in a vacuum? Furthermore, is such a description actually valid and is it beneficial to the 
Aborigines' cause?14 These questions will be addressed in this paper.  
C The Indians' Claim 
The Indians sought a declaration that they had "ownership" of 58,000 square kilometres of 
central British Columbia. They claimed that they and their ancestors had, since time 
immemorial, lived in, controlled, possessed and exercised jurisdiction over the land in 
accordance with their traditional aboriginal laws and customs. Having never surrendered their 
  
10  R v Symonds (1847) [1840-1932] NZPCC 387; Calder v AG of British Columbia above n7, Mabo v State of 
Queensland above n 4. 
11  The Supreme Court in Calder above n 7, affirmed the Privy Council's principle in Amodu Tijani v 
Secretary, Southern Nigeria above n 7, that aboriginal rights must be "presumed to have continued to 
exist unless the contrary is established by the context or circumstances." Hall J elaborated, stating that 
"the onus of proving that the sovereign intended to extinguish the Indian title lies on the [Crown]." The 
same onus has been applied in R v Sparrow, above n 3 and Simon v R (1985) 24 DLR (4th) 390 (SCC), a 
treaty rights case, where Dickson CJ placed the burden on the Crown to lead evidence.  
12  Dickson CJC first introduced the notion that aboriginal title was sui generis in Guerin v Canada above n 
7. This was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Paul v Canadian Pacific Ltd and Roberts v Canada (1989) 
57 DLR (4th) 197. 
13  St Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co v The Queen (1888) 14 AC 46, 54 (PC). 
14  William Flanagan, in his article "Piercing the Veil of Real Property Law: Delgamuukw v British 
Columbia" (1998) 24(1) Queen's LJ 279 ["Piercing the Veil"], argues that the Supreme Court had weak 
grounds for classifying aboriginal title as a sui generis interest and states that if aboriginal title is 
analysed under common law principles, it is equivalent or superior to a fee simple estate.  
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ownership by conquest or treaty, they asserted a legal right to govern the territory according to 
their own laws, which they claimed, at first instance, to be paramount to the laws of British 
Columbia.15 They accepted that the Crown held the underlying title to the soil by virtue of 
settlement, but did not believe that this lessened their right to ownership and self-government.    
The Province of British Columbia (the Province) counter-claimed. It argued that there was 
no aboriginal title in British Columbia because settlement had extinguished any pre-existing 
systems of aboriginal law and introduced British law in its place. Under this narrow view of 
settlement theory, the Province argued that "the only title and rights that could exist were 
those granted or recognised by the Crown."16 The Province conceded that the Calder 
Proclamations17 passed between 1852 and 1866 had reserved the main areas of land occupied 
by Indians from alienation and pre-emption, and allowed Indians to use the "vacant" Crown 
lands for sustenance purposes.18  However, the land in these reserves did not amount to 
aboriginal title land, because "[i]n this scheme there was no room for other aboriginal 
interests."19  
D Decisions of the Lower Courts 
1 Supreme Court of British Columbia 1991 
The trial in the Supreme Court of British Columbia lasted 374 days and involved, among 
other things, 76 witnesses, 23,503 pages of transcript evidence, 9200 exhibits and 32 binders of 
documents. Despite this, the result was unsatisfying for the Indians. Ignoring the uniqueness of 
aboriginal title, Chief Justice McEachern attempted to analyse aboriginal title within the 
  
15  On appeal to the British Columbia Court of Appeal, the claimants rejected their initial assertion that 
their laws were paramount to the laws of the province. Instead they advanced a claim for self-
government limited to the administration and regulation of their lands.  
16  Delgamuukw v British Columbia (1991) 79 DLR (4th) 185 (BCSC)) [Delgamuukw (BCSC)]. The Province's 
view complied with the common law doctrine of tenures and estates. As aboriginal title was neither 
created by Crown grant nor recognised by the Provincial government, it could not exist.   
17  The Calder Proclamations were designed to foster the development of lands of the colony for 
settlement. Calder II stated that all lands in BC and all the minerals therein, belonged to the Crown in 
fee. Further ordinances (Calder IV to IX) promoted further settlement, and in 1866, Calder XIII was 
made to consolidate the earlier ordinances referring to the settlement of lands. 
18  In the context of British Columbia, "vacant Crown lands" meant any lands that were not specifically 
"reserved" for Indians under the Calder III Proclamation. 
19  Delgamuukw (BCSC) above n 16, 285. 
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common law doctrine of tenure and estates. In doing so, he dismissed the Indians' claims of 
ownership and jurisdiction, concluding that aboriginal title was not a proprietary interest but 
rather one that existed "at the pleasure of the Crown" and had been extinguished by numerous 
Crown acts with the requisite "clear and plain intention."20  
Taking a "traditional white view", 21 Chief Justice McEachern disregarded the Indians' 
evidence, describing it as "a romantic view"22 of the history that was "not literally true."23  
He found that the Indians' evidence of habitation on the land had not satisfied the Baker 
Lake test for establishing aboriginal title.24 However, he made a finding of fact that 45 square 
kilometres of the territory was reserve land. Having previously found that all aboriginal title 
had been extinguished, this seems to suggest that aboriginal title can override a Crown grant of 
land, which under common law has priority by virtue of its feudal origins. This proposition 
has significant implications that have recently been discussed in the Wik decision in Australia, 
but are beyond the bounds of this analysis.  
McEachern CJBC also conceded some non-exclusive and non-commercial aboriginal 
sustenance rights exercisable on vacant Crown lands.25 These rights were limited to activities  
 
  
20  The "clear and plain intention" test for extinguishment of aboriginal title and rights was developed by 
the USSC in United States v Santa Fe Pacific Ry Co (1941) 314, 339 and adopted into Canadian 
jurisprudence by Chief Justice Dickson in R v Sparrow, above n 3. McEachern CJBC considered the 
Calder Proclamations as impliedly having this effect and thus concluded that all title and rights had 
been extinguished in the late 19th century. 
21  Paul Tennant, quoted in "Rethinking British Columbia: The Challenge of Delgamuukw" in Frank 
Cassidy (ed) Aboriginal Title in British Columbia: Delgamuukw v The Queen above n 6, 11.  
22  Delgamuukw  (BCSC) above n 16. 
23  Delgamuukw  (BCSC) above n 16.  
24  Hamlet of Baker Lake v Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (1980) 1 FC 518. The  Baker Lake 
test required: 1) The claimants and their ancestors were members of an organised society; 2) the 
organised society occupied the specific territory over which they assert the title; 3) the occupation must 
be to the exclusion of others; and 4) that the occupation was an established fact at the time of 
sovereignty. 
25  On the evidence, McEachern CJBC found that most of the territory was vacant land (as defined above 
n 15) although he found that village land equating to 45 square miles of the territory had been made 
into a reserve pursuant to the Calder III Proclamation. This 1859 Proclamation entitled the settlers to 
pre-emption of unsurveyed lands, but reserved town sites, auriferous land and Indian settlements. 
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"practised and used before exposure to European civilisation"26 and arose from a fiduciary 
duty on the Crown. On this basis, McEachern CJBC concluded that these sustenance rights 
were not subject to constitutional protection under section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982,27 
and accordingly would subsist until the land was dedicated to an adverse purpose, upon 
which they would be extinguished. 
2 British Columbia Court of Appeal 1993 
The majority decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal was similarly unsatisfying 
for the Indians. Macfarlane, Taggart and Wallace J J A rejected the ownership and jurisdiction 
claims due to their reluctance to interfere with McEachern CJBC's findings of fact. Despite 
criticising the trial judge's approach to the evidence, especially his rejection of aboriginal oral 
histories, the appeal judges felt there was no "palpable or overriding error"28 which would 
justify their intervention.  
Contrary to McEachern CJBC's decision, the majority found there was no "plain and clear 
intention" to extinguish aboriginal rights by the provincial government prior to 1871 and 
accordingly recognised the existence of these rights. However, only unextinguished, non-
exclusive aboriginal sustenance rights limited to "those traditions regarded by [the] aboriginal 
society as integral to the distinctive culture, and existing at the date sovereignty was 
asserted"29 were recognised. This was because the majority subscribed to the view that 
aboriginal title should only extend to those practices on the land that uphold the group's 
connection with the land, and modern practices were incapable of doing this.    
  
26  Delgamuukw (BCSC) above n 16, 391. This was because McEachern believed that only long-time 
Aboriginal uses of land could be protected under the doctrine of aboriginal title. This differs from the 
view taken by the SCC in R v Sparrow, above n 3, decided a year earlier, that allowed aboriginal rights 
to develop and modernise.  
27  Constitution Act 1982, section 35(1). "The existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal 
peoples of Canada are hereby recognised and affirmed." McEachern concluded that the protection 
afforded under section 35 is for "existing" aboriginal rights in 1982, whereas rights arising under a 
fiduciary duty are "created" by that duty at the time of judgment (compare the decision in the SCC 
regarding the Crown's fiduciary duty, below p 12). 
28  Delgamuukw v British Columbia (1993) 104 DLR (4th) 470, 557 per Wallace JA (BCCA) [Delgamuukw 
(BCCA)]. 
29  Delgamuukw (BCCA) above n 28, 492. This was the prevailing view of aboriginal title and rights prior 
to the Supreme Court judgment, and was the conclusion reached in the 1996 cases (above n 3) 
regarding the scope of aboriginal rights.    
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Lambert and Hutcheon J J A dissented. Lambert J A's judgment was a pre-cursor to the 
Supreme Court's decision, in fact allowing a more extensive and unlimited right to the land 
than the Supreme Court. Finding that the trial judge had made substantial errors in his 
findings of fact, Lambert J A substituted his own findings, namely that the Indians had 
established historic occupation, possession, use and enjoyment of the land in accordance with 
their customs and traditions. He concluded that aboriginal title had been established in large 
parts of the territory, and unlimited sustenance rights established in those areas where title 
could not be found. Contrary to the majority, Lambert J A extended to the title-holders the 
right to use the land however they chose, not limited to uses "integral to the distinctive 
culture." 30  Site or activity-specific rights on land not subject to title may be limited in their 
contemporary execution, but, significantly, it is the:31 
aboriginal peoples' own description of the right which should control the way in which it is 
expressed, not the description selected by the white settlers' society to meet the needs of the settlers' 
society by making all aboriginal rights as narrow as possible. 
III DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 1997 
When the highest court in the land addressed the Indians' claims, they too were unable to 
solve the riddle of aboriginal title. The Court refused make a definitive ruling on the basis that 
the trial judge had "misapprehended or overlooked material evidence,"32 and ordered a new 
trial to reinterpret the facts in light of the "aboriginal perspective" of the law. This new trial is 
yet to be heard.  
At the Supreme Court, the Indians changed their claim from "ownership" to one of  
"common law aboriginal title." This was because it was difficult to reconcile "ownership" 
derived from aboriginal title and the notion of "ownership" as a fee simple estate.33 The 
  
30  Delgamuukw (BCCA) above n 28, 648. Lambert JA rejects the "integral to the distinctive culture" test in 
respect of aboriginal rights (and by inference, title). Citing with approval Dickson CJ's view in R v 
Sparrow above n 3, he says, "…aboriginal rights are evolving rights. They are not frozen at the time of 
sovereignty or at any other time. The evolution which occurred before sovereignty and the evolution 
which occurred after sovereignty are both relevant to an understanding of the rights." 
31  Delgamuukw (BCCA) above n 28, 659-60, relying on R v Sparrow above n 3, 1112. 
32  Delgamuukw (SCC) above n 2, 229 per Lamer CJC. 
33  Amending the claim to one of aboriginal title also allowed for a decision consistent with the common 
law doctrine of tenures and estates and removed the difficulties raised by a claim based on a form of 
"allodial  ownership", which was impossible under the doctrine of tenure.   
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claimants did argue, however, that their right to the land equated to an inalienable fee simple 
estate. Furthermore, they changed their claim for "jurisdiction" to one of "self-government." If 
both claims were successful, aboriginal title would be an interest "significantly broader than 
that recognised by fee simple."34      
A The Source of Aboriginal Title 
For decades the Commonwealth courts had been "vacillating between two possible sources 
of aboriginal title."35 It is accepted that aboriginal title arises by operation of law and pre-dates 
British colonisation and sovereignty,36 but the question of the source of aboriginal title has 
been a controversial one. Although historic occupation and use of the land by an organised 
society is the most widely accepted source of aboriginal title,37 other judges have alluded to a 
basis in the pre-existing systems of aboriginal law. 
To resolve this confusion surrounding the source of aboriginal title, Lamer CJC stated that 
aboriginal title has a "dual source" in both historic aboriginal occupation and pre-existing 
systems of aboriginal law. Although historic occupation and possession are crucial to finding 
title under common law, aboriginal laws are an intrinsic aspect of the group's occupation of the 
land, and define the nature of the group's connection with the land which determines the 
content of aboriginal title.38  Furthermore, proof of a system of aboriginal law existing prior to 
  
34  "Piercing the Veil" above n 14, 292. This is because self-governing rights do not accompany a fee simple 
estate. 
35  Kent McNeil "The Meaning of Aboriginal Title," in Michael Asch (ed) Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in 
Canada (UBC Press, Vancouver, 1997) 135, 137. ["The Meaning of Aboriginal Title"]. Canadian, United 
States and New Zealand courts tend to subscribe to the "historic occupation" test, whereas the courts in 
Australia were more open to finding that Aboriginal systems of law existing at the time of sovereignty 
were sufficient to show title.      
36  Guerin v Canada above n 7;  Roberts above n 9, per Wilson J.  
37  Justice Judson stated in Calder above n 7, that aboriginal title is based on the fact that "when the settlers 
came, the Indians were there, organised in societies and occupying the land as their forefathers had 
done for centuries."   
38  This accords with Brennan J's judgment in Mabo v State of Queensland where he states that native title is 
based on the group's exclusive occupation, but the traditional laws and customs apply internally to 
determine the content of the rights and interests possessed by its members, known as the  "incidents of 
native title". Mabo, above n 4, 51-52. 
 
480 (2000) 31 VUWLR 
sovereignty legitimises aboriginal title as a legal right pre-dating colonisation and 
sovereignty:39  
If aboriginal title is based simply on occupation of lands by an organised society at the time the 
Crown asserted sovereignty, how could it be a pre-existing right? For it to exist as a legal right 
before the Crown acquired sovereignty, it would need to be based on some system of law, which 
would have to be aboriginal, as no other law existed in North America prior to European 
colonisation. 
B The Nature and Content of Aboriginal Title 
1 Lamer CJC 
After considering both the aboriginal and common law perspectives on aboriginal title, 
Lamer CJC confirmed the conclusion reached in some earlier precedents that aboriginal title 
and rights constituted sui generis interests - neither personal, nor equivalent to fee simple 
ownership. His reasons for finding aboriginal title to be sui generis were threefold – its 
inalienability except to the Crown; its communal and collective nature; and its source in the 
prior occupation of lands by aboriginal people in accordance with their own pre-existing 
systems of law.  
Under the doctrine of tenure, estates can only arise after the assertion of sovereignty. As 
Lamer CJC stated, "aboriginal title is a burden on the Crown's underlying title and it does not 
make sense to speak of a burden on the underlying title before that title exists."40  Accordingly, 
the sui generis nature of aboriginal title is justified on the basis of the source of aboriginal title in 
pre-existing systems of aboriginal law. The Court's other bases for this classification, notably its 
source in possession and occupation and its communal nature are less persuasive reasons, as 
they can also be characteristics of common law property rights.41  
Despite classifying aboriginal title as sui generis, Lamer CJC was unable to avoid analogies 
with common law tenets of property law. Although he dismissed the suggestion that 
  
39 "The Meaning of Aboriginal Title" above n 35, 137. 
40  Delgamuukw (SCC) above n 2, 224.  
41  "Piercing the Veil" above n 14, 303-308, argues persuasively that these latter characteristics are not 
unknown at common law. For example, possession can be the basis of title at common law (finder's 
title) and title can also be held communally at common law (for example, members of a club or 
unincorporated society may be in concurrent occupation of their co-property).   
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aboriginal title creates a fee simple estate, he concluded that it is "a right to the land itself."42  
Consequently, uses of the land are not limited to those practices exercised at the time of 
sovereignty or those "integral to the distinctive culture." As an exclusive right, the title-holders 
can determine for themselves the uses to which they put the land. They are free to engage in 
non-traditional uses of land such as mining, lumbering and oil and gas extraction. These rights 
are analogous to those of an owner of a fee simple estate. Furthermore, aboriginal title-holders 
can prevent others, including the government, from intruding on and using their lands without 
their consent.43 This final aspect exceeds the privileges possessed by a fee simple title-holder 
and in fact expands aboriginal title beyond any common law property right. 
To distinguish aboriginal title from an interest equivalent to a fee simple estate, Lamer CJC 
imposed an inherent limitation upon it. In order to preserve the basis of aboriginal title (that is 
to say, the dual sources of aboriginal title), Lamer CJC stated that "[l]ands held pursuant to 
aboriginal title cannot be used in a manner that is irreconcilable with the nature of the 
attachment to the land which forms the basis of the group's claim to aboriginal title."44 Lamer 
CJC justified this limitation by referring to the sui generis status of aboriginal title.  
Lamer CJC imposed a further limitation on aboriginal title.  Unlike a common law 
proprietary interest, which arises from a Crown grant and entitles the owner to dispose of his 
interest to any third party, aboriginal title, as a sui generis interest, constitutes a burden on the 
Crown's underlying title and therefore is inalienable except to the Crown. Consequently, if an 
aboriginal group wishes to dispose of their interest, they must voluntarily cede their title to the 
Crown, who then becomes the holder of the absolute title of the land. The Crown can then 
grant a fee simple interest to another party, or the aboriginal group should they wish to use the 
land for a purpose adverse to their connection with the land. 
  
42  Delgamuuwk (SCC) above n 2, 240. This resembles comments by Wallace JA in the BCCA that 
aboriginal title could amount to quite extensive interests in land, to the extent that it may resemble a 
common law proprietary title. 
43  Therefore, any intrusion onto their lands, unless authorised by law, would be a violation of their 
constitutionalised rights and be an actionable trespass.   
44  Delgamuukw (SCC) above n 2, 246-247, per Lamer CJC. In order to maintain the continuity between the 
historic patterns of occupation and present-day recognition of title, "uses of the lands that would 
threaten that future relationship are, by their very nature, excluded from the content of aboriginal 
title." 
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2 La Forest J 
La Forest J concurred with the Chief Justice's conclusion, but took a different approach. 
Instead of recognising a dual source of aboriginal title, he relied on the common law source of 
title, namely exclusive occupation and use. He rejected the notion that proof of aboriginal laws 
pre-existing sovereignty could be the basis of title45 and set out four requirements to prove 
aboriginal title: precision as to the uses of the land, specificity as to the area, continuity of 
occupation and centrality.46 The aspect of centrality was paramount. "[I]f aboriginal peoples 
continue to occupy and use the land as part of their traditional way of life, it necessarily 
follows that the land is of central significance to them."47 Such centrality means that the land can 
only be used in ways that do not sever the significance the land has to the group. This 
statement accords with Lamer CJC's "inherent limitation" on aboriginal title. 
C Proof of Aboriginal Title  
Lamer CJC emphasised the necessity to refer equally to common and aboriginal 
perspectives of property when analysing claims to title.48 As the common law recognises 
actual physical occupation and possession of land as the source of title, a claim's success would 
be enhanced by proof of construction of dwellings, cultivation of crops and use of regular areas 
of land for hunting and fishing at the time of sovereignty.49   
  
45  La Forest J recognised that the houses' claim was stated as one of "aboriginal title", but the evidence 
presented sought to prove more than title – "complete control over the territory in question."They tried 
to show that "by virtue of their social and land tenure systems, they had acquired an absolute interest 
in the claimed territory, including ownership and jurisdiction over the land." He stated that their 
reliance on this as a basis for aboriginal title was incorrect and therefore provided the grounds for a 
new trial.    
46  These four requirements were devised by Lamer CJC in R v Van Der Peet, above n3. 
47  Delgamuukw (SCC) above n 2, 281 per La Forest J. 
48  This was highlighted in R v Van Der Peet above n 3 per Lamer CJC. "A court should approach the rules of 
evidence, and interpret the evidence that exists, with a consciousness of the special nature of Aboriginal 
claims, and of the evidentiary difficulties in proving a right which originated in times where there 
were no written records of the practices, customs and traditions engaged in. The courts must not 
undervalue the evidence presented by Aboriginal claimants simply because the evidence does not conform 
precisely with the evidentiary standards that would apply in, for example, a private law torts case." 
49  The time of sovereignty being the appropriate time for determining Aboriginal occupation and use 
differs from the decisions in the aboriginal rights cases, such as R v Van Der Peet above n 3, where the 
date of first contact was deemed to be the appropriate time. Although aboriginal rights are a subset of 
aboriginal title, the Court felt that aboriginal rights would be best defined in terms of the society before 
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The aboriginal perspective on the land could be gleaned from traditional laws, customs and 
practices of the people on the land, and would assist in determining the group's connection 
with the land. The aboriginal perspective of "exclusivity" embodies the notion of shared 
exclusivity, and as such, aboriginal title will not be denied where more than one group 
occupies or uses the land.50 Where other aboriginal groups were present in the territory, 
"exclusivity" involved "the intention and capacity to retain exclusive control."51  In cases of 
shared occupancy, the land would be held by joint aboriginal title.52  Such a concept is not 
unknown at common law,53 and thus this finding represents a conclusion based on 
consideration of both the aboriginal and common law perspectives of "exclusivity."    
D Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction to Infringe or Extinguish Title 
As a "right to the land itself," aboriginal title under Lamer CJC's analysis is a real property 
right. Being a type of aboriginal right, it is also constitutionally protected under section 35(1) of 
the Constitution Act 1982. This suggests it can only be infringed upon or extinguished in 
                                                                                                                                                                        
the arrival of settlers. Conversely, aboriginal title could not be recognised until the introduction of the 
common law. Lamer CJC acknowledged the difficulty in showing pre-sovereignty occupation and 
suggested groups could rely on evidence of present occupation if there was a "substantial 
maintenance" of the connection with the land. As long as a continued connection can be proved, 
present occupation will suffice in a claim for aboriginal title. La Forest J went further and said that 
occupation of a different territory after sovereignty could still give rise to aboriginal title in respect of 
that land. He acknowledged that groups which occupied a certain area prior to sovereignty may have 
moved to another territory after the arrival of British governance. Such relocation should not deny 
them a claim of aboriginal title, as they have a connection with pre-sovereignty occupation of another 
area. This is an admirable approach enabling groups who had been forced from their traditional 
territories to claim aboriginal title to other territories. 
50  The nature of Aboriginal society was such that Aboriginal groups did not necessarily have the rights to 
use the land to the exclusion of all others. Evidence shows that territories over which particular groups 
asserted some means of control were not always exclusively occupied by them. Kent McNeil suggests 
that "where others were allowed access upon request, the very fact that permission was asked for and 
given would be further evidence of the group's exclusive control." Kent McNeil Common Law Aboriginal 
Title (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989) 204. Also quoted in Delgamuukw (SCC) above n 2, 259 per Lamer 
CJC.   
51 Delgamuukw (SCC) above n 2, 259. 
52 Delgamuukw (SCC) above n 2, 259 per Lamer CJC.  "Shared exclusive possession is the right to exclude 
others except those with whom possession is shared."  
53 At common law it is possible to have shared ownership and possession of land or chattels by joint 
tenants or tenants in common.   
 
484 (2000) 31 VUWLR 
exceptional circumstances for justifiable reasons. Why then does the Supreme Court justify 
federal and provincial infringement and extinguishment of aboriginal title? 
Lamer CJC suggests that aboriginal title and rights can be infringed or extinguished subject 
to a test of justification. The test suggested by the Supreme Court, based on Gladstone, is a 
significant deviation from the liberal Sparrow test,54 as it allows, among other things, 
infringement in pursuit of economic goals which do not necessarily benefit the aboriginal 
groups.55  Should the Crown infringe aboriginal rights or title on this lenient basis, it will 
effectively be abrogating its fiduciary duty, which as an aspect of aboriginal title and rights is 
constitutionally protected.56 However, it is possible for the Crown to infringe aboriginal rights, 
yet still uphold its fiduciary duty, through minimum infringement, fair compensation57 and 
engaging in consultation with the affected group.58     
  
54  The R v Sparrow test for justified federal legislative infringements placed the burden of proof on the 
government for proving that they 1) had a valid legislative objective and 2) that any infringement 
upheld the Crown's fiduciary duty.    
55  R v Gladstone above n 3, was a commercial fishing claim. Lamer reasoned that the threshold for 
infringement could be lowered in such cases. The author concurs with McLachlin J in R v Van Der Peet, 
above n 3, when she commented how it is unacceptable and unconstitutional for the Crown to give 
non-Aboriginal people a "portion" of aboriginal rights. 
56  Consequently the obligation to pay compensation and consult with natives is constitutional and 
therefore unable to be circumvented by legislation. Kent McNeil "Defining Aboriginal Rights in the 
90s: Has the Supreme Court Finally Got it Right?" Robarts Centre for Canadian Studies, York 
University. Guest Lecture March 1999, 23 ["Defining Aboriginal Rights in the 90s"]. 
57  Due to the inescapable economic value of land, the Supreme Court in Guerin v Canada above n 7, had 
emphasised that compensation is necessary for breaches of the Crown's fiduciary duty. This principle 
was embraced by the court in Delgamuukw. Whenever the Crown breaches its fiduciary duty, 
compensation is payable, the level of which will vary with the nature of the aboriginal title and the 
infringement. Compare with the situation in Australia, where under s 22 of the Native Title Amendment 
Act 1998 (Cth), the amount of compensation is calculated to equate to the freehold value of the land, 
although s 31 of the same Act requires compensation to be paid on "just terms." Maureen Tehan 
"Delgamuukw v British Columbia" (1998) 22(3) Melb Uni LR 763, 781.   
58  Consultation is an intrinsic element of the fiduciary duty, although "the nature and scope of the duty 
of consultation will vary with the circumstances. In occasional cases, where the breach is less serious or 
relatively minor, it will be no more than a duty to discuss important decisions that will be taken in 
respect of lands held pursuant to aboriginal title… In most cases, it will be significantly deeper than 
mere consultation. Some cases may even require the full consent of the Aboriginal nation." 
Delgamuukw  (SCC) above n 2, 265.    
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The Supreme Court did not specifically address the issue of extinguishment, except to 
affirm that extinguishment requires an expressly "clear and plain" intention to extinguish by a 
legislative or executive act of the federal government.59 In Delgamuukw, the Crown did not 
discharge the onus to prove extinguishment by the Province, which in any case had no 
jurisdiction to extinguish or even infringe aboriginal title, as will be highlighted below. 
In his discussion of infringement and extinguishment, Lamer CJC states that both federal 
and provincial governments have the authority to infringe or extinguish aboriginal rights and 
title.60 This explicitly contradicts his own interpretation of section 91(24) of the Constitution 
Act 1867, which places jurisdiction over "Indians, and lands reserved for Indians" with the 
federal government alone. At one stage in his judgment, Lamer CJC correctly concludes that:61 
provincial governments are prevented from legislating in relation to both types of aboriginal rights. 
Laws which purport to extinguish those rights…touch the core of Indianness which lies at the heart 
of section 91(24) and are beyond the legislative competence of the provinces to enact. 
However, later in his judgment, he suggests that provincial governments have the 
jurisdiction to infringe aboriginal title and rights through legislative instruments. He suggests 
that: 62 
the development of agriculture, forestry, mining and hydro-electric power, the general economic 
development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered 
species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign populations to support those 
aims are justifiable infringements of aboriginal title. Initiatives in furtherance of provincial 
development are almost certainly facilitated by the provincial legislature.  
  
59  Above n 27. Justice Brennan in Mabo v State of Queensland above n 4, 46 cites persuasive reasons for 
using such a threshold. "The requirement [of a clear and plan intention to extinguish]…flows from the 
seriousness of the consequences to indigenous inhabitants of extinguishing their traditional rights and 
interests in the land." 
60 Delgamuukw (SCC) above n 2, 260 per Lamer CJC. He cites R v Cote above n 3, as an example of 
provincial legislation justifiably infringing aboriginal rights. What he fails to observe is that R v Cote 
concerned sustenance rights, not title, and due to its very nature, justifications for infringing title are 
necessarily higher. 
61  Delgamuukw (SCC) above n 2, 270. 
62  Delgamuukw (SCC) above n 2, 263-264. 
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What Lamer CJC is suggesting is that provincial governments can act in disregard to 
section 91(24) of the Constitution Act 1867 and infringe constitutionally protected aboriginal 
rights "in pursuit of regional and economic fairness."63  
Lamer CJC's conclusion must be flawed. After 1867, the provincial government lost all 
constitutional jurisdiction over aboriginal title.64 Surely if aboriginal title is inextinguishable by 
provincial legislation, it is also unable to be infringed by provincial legislation. McNeil 
describes Lamer CJC's discrepancy an "an oversight, a case of the left hand having forgotten 
what the right hand has done."65 In the author's view, this is not merely an oversight, but a 
substantial judicial error, based on a misapplication of case law66 and requires urgent 
redemption. 
E Claim for Self-Government  
By passing the issue of self-government to another trial, Lamer CJC denied himself the 
opportunity to set a precedent for future aboriginal self-government claims. He did suggest, 
however, that aboriginal title contains a community-vested decision-making authority in 
respect of the land. Aboriginal groups can determine to what uses they will put the land, in 
accordance with their internal laws, but subject to the condition that the use does not sever 
their connection to the land.67  
  
63  R v Gladstone above n 3. Lamer CJC reasoned that as Aboriginal societies exist as part of a broader 
social, political and economic community, it may be justifiable to infringe their rights in order to 
pursue compelling and substantially important objectives that benefit the whole community.  
64  This has been confirmed in numerous case, including Derrickson v Derrrickson [1986] 1 SCR 285;  
Corporation of Surrey v Peace Arch (1970) 74 WWR 380.  
65  "Defining Aboriginal Rights in the 90s" above n 56, 25. 
66  Lamer CJC relies on his own decision in R v Cote above n 3, to allow provincial infringement of 
aboriginal title. In R v Cote which concerned a regulatory infringement of Aboriginal fishing rights, 
Lamer CJC accepted that the provincial government could infringe the rights on the basis that it was a 
treaty right. Lamer decided this by misinterpreting Cory J's comments in  R v Badger [1996] 1 SCR 771, 
which had allowed provincial "modification" of a treaty right on the basis of the R v Sparrow test. 
Lamer in R v Cote said "It is quite clear [from Badger] that the R v Sparrow test applies where a 
provincial law is alleged to have infringed an Aboriginal or treaty right in a manner which cannot be 
justified. The text and purpose of s 35(1) do not distinguish between federal and provincial laws which 
restrict Aboriginal or treaty rights, and they should both be subject to the same scrutiny. " R v Cote 
above n 3, 185.      
67  "… there is an implied recognition that the Aboriginal society must have a degree of self-government 
necessary to allocate the use of the land to which aboriginal title extends; to decide on utilisation 
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This right is rooted in the existence of aboriginal legal systems prior to the arrival of the 
British settlers.68 A logical and indeed necessary extension of a legal system is a form of 
government, as law requires a mechanism to be exercised through. Consequently, Lamer CJC 
imputed that the Indians have a system of "self-government" in respect to their land.  
IV COMMENTS ON THE JUDGMENT 
The Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Delgamuukw has been hailed as the new 
benchmark for aboriginal claims litigation. Not only did the Supreme Court reinforce the 
finding in Calder that aboriginal title is recognised in British Columbia, and make some 
revolutionary statements on its source and content, but it also set out expanded guidelines for 
interpreting evidence in aboriginal claims. The Court recommended future courts to give due 
deference to aboriginal oral histories and anthropological evidence69 - they are part of the 
wider corpus of evidence, and courts should not begin with the assumption that such material 
is unreliable.70  Future finders of fact must acknowledge both common law and aboriginal 
perspectives of the law and courts must appreciate the difficulties aboriginal people face when 
being questioned within the context of a "foreign" legal structure.  
                                                                                                                                                                        
practices; to determine which resources should be harvested and by whom; to participate in the 
process of consultation that would lead to justification of infringement; to agree to the amount of 
compensation under infringement and justification; and to decide upon the surrender of the land, if 
that is the wish of the people." Hon Justice Lambert "Van Der Peet and Delgamuukw: 10 Unresolved 
Issues" (1998) 32(2) UBCLR 249, 268 ["10 Unresolved Issues"]. 
68 Delgamuukw (SCC) above n 2, 242. "aboriginal title…is a collective right to the land held by all 
members of an Aboriginal nation. Decisions with respect to the land are also made by that 
community."  
69  Lamer CJC implores future judges to "come to terms with oral histories of Aboriginal societies, which 
for many Aboriginal nations, is the only record of their past." Delgamuukw (SCC) above n 2.  The Chief 
Justice's views accord with those of Eric Colvin who observed that "the ordinary judicial system is an 
inappropriate mechanism for the claims of indigenous peoples…[The] rules of evidence were not 
designed to handle the complex historical issues often raised by these claims." Eric Colvin, Legal 
Processes and the Resolution of Indian Claims (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 
1981) 28, cited in Geoff Sherrott "The Court's Treatment of the Evidence in Delgamuuwk v B.C." (1992) 
56 Sask LR 441, 441.     
70  Anthropology "begins with an assumption that Aboriginal people have evolved complex and 
meaningful adaptations to their environments…[and]… assumes that culture is a dynamic an living 
identity that continues to change and adapt to changing circumstances." Robin Ridington, cited in 
Brian Thom, Aboriginal Rights in Canada after Delgamuukw: Anthropological Perspectives. McGill 
University, Montreal, January 1999) <http://home.istar.ca/~bthom> [Anthropological Perspectives].  
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The Court found that aboriginal title is based on exclusive occupation and use of lands in 
accordance with customary laws prior to the assertion of British sovereignty.  Aboriginal title, 
as a "right to the land," entitles the title-holders to an exclusive right to occupy and use the land 
for a full range of uses, determinable by the group, but subject to an inherent limitation – that 
the uses do not destroy the group's connection with the land that forms that basis of their 
aboriginal title. This indicates the Court's caution to extend aboriginal title to an interest 
comparable to a fee simple estate. Accordingly, the permitted uses of the land will necessarily 
be "aboriginal" uses, defined within the scope of the group's customary laws. They will be 
equivalent to the "incidents" of aboriginal title described by Brennan J in Mabo.  Furthermore, 
the Court found that because of its sui generis nature, constitutionally protected aboriginal title 
and rights can be justifiably infringed or extinguished by federal and provincial governments. 
However, in respect of infringement, consultation and fair compensation are necessary to 
uphold the Crown's constitutional fiduciary duty. 
The Delgamuukw judgment is undoubtedly significant for the jurisprudence on aboriginal 
title. Yet questions remain unanswered. To what extent does the source of aboriginal title in 
pre-existing systems of law impose limitations on the content of aboriginal title? Is this 
limitation justified or should aboriginal title create an interest equivalent to common law 
ownership? Who will determine if the limitation has been exceeded? Where does aboriginal 
title fit within the common law?  
A Aboriginal Title Claims and the Common Law   
Although the Supreme Court has renounced the application of common law principles to 
aboriginal rights and title cases,71 it seems unable to heed its own warning in Delgamuukw and 
defines aboriginal title in terms not unlike those in common law property law. Even though 
"[t]he need to distinguish the claim from common law tenure and notions of fee simple [was]… 
reflected in the change of pleadings from a claim for ownership to a claim for aboriginal 
title,"72 the Supreme Court continued to interpret the issue of aboriginal title under a common 
law framework. In doing so, it created inconsistencies in its judgment which are difficult to 
reconcile. 
  
71  Lamer CJC stated the inapplicability of common law principles to such cases, as he did in another 1997 
aboriginal rights case, St Mary's Indian Band v Cranbrook [1997] 2 SCR 657, where the Supreme Court 
referred, at 669, to the need to "pierce the veil of real property law in adjudicating native lands rights 
disputes."  
72  Delgamuukw  above n 57, 780. 
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Lamer CJC is cautious to avoid the language of "ownership" in his judgment, yet he 
concedes that aboriginal title is the right to "exclusive use and occupation of the land". He 
implies that aboriginal title is a proprietary right by describing it as a "right to the land itself" – 
in other words, a right akin to ownership. 
At common law, proof of occupancy is dependent on evidence of use.  The uses relied upon 
to show occupancy do not limit the extent of the title. Conversely, the usual approach towards 
aboriginal title and rights is to define them in terms of those uses "integral to the distinctive 
culture of the group," thus locking aboriginal peoples in an historical time-warp in respect of 
the activities permitted on their lands. In Delgamuukw, Lamer CJC, contrary to his warning,  
adopts the wide-embracing common law approach when determining the content of aboriginal 
title. He states that the title-holding group can determine how it will utilise the land, which can 
be for any use that need not be integral to the distinctive culture. Lamer CJC suggests that 
mining, lumbering and oil and gas extraction could be possible uses of aboriginal title land.73  
However, uncomfortable in granting aboriginal-title holders an interest equivalent to a fee 
simple, Lamer CJC states the sui generis nature of aboriginal title is justification for limiting the 
uses to which the land can be put to those that retain the group's connection with the land. 
These limitations maintain the "special bond"74 between historic, present and future 
occupation and reflect the source of aboriginal title in pre-existing systems of aboriginal law. 
Although Lamer CJC explicitly states the limitation does not "amount to a legal strait-jacket on 
aboriginal peoples who have a legitimate claim to the land," 75 it nevertheless may have the 
effect of freezing land uses to those defined by customary law.76  
  
73  This is consistent with earlier Canadian and American jurisprudence which has extended aboriginal 
title to uses which were not traditionally exercised by the groups. Blueberry River Indian Band v Canada 
(1995) 130 DLR (4th) 193 and United States ex rel Chunie v Ringrose (9th Cir, 1986) 788 F 2d 638, 642. 
"aboriginal title entitles the tribes to full use and enjoyment of the surface and mineral estate, and to 
resources, such as timber, on the land." 
74  Delgamuukw (SCC) above n 2, 247. 
75  Delgamuukw (SCC) above n 2, 249 per Lamer CJC.  
76 Limiting aboriginal title to those customary rights exercised in historic times has been condemned in 
many judgments. The Privy Council decision in Hineiti Rireire Arani v Public Trustee [1840-1935] 
NZPCC 1, discouraged the freezing of rights, allowing the Maori to modify their customs in relation to 
their uses of the land. Similarly, Toohey J in Mabo, said modification of traditional society in itself does 
not mean that traditional title no longer exists. Traditional title arises from fact of occupation, not the 
occupation of a particular kind of society or way of life. So long as occupation by a traditional society 
is established now and at the time of annexation, traditional rights exist. An indigenous society 
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The Court seems unable to reconcile its familiarity with the common law with its finding 
that aboriginal title is a sui generis interest. This results in an ambiguous statement on the 
content of aboriginal title. On one hand, the Court suggests aboriginal title creates an all-
encompassing interest in the land, allowing modern and non-aboriginal activities to be 
executed on the land; on the other hand, it restricts the uses of aboriginal title land to those that 
retain the "special bond" connecting the group's present occupation of the land with their 
ancestors' historic occupation.  Surely activities such as mining, lumbering and mineral and gas 
extraction are irreconcilable with the Aborigines' connection with the land which is enhanced 
by their customary laws.  
On which side of the fence does the Supreme Court wish to sit? It appears it cannot decide. 
Lamer CJC's judgment exemplifies the inconsistencies created when courts attempt to fuse the 
unique nature of aboriginal title with common law notions of property. His paradoxical 
conclusion that aboriginal title is both "all-encompassing" and "inherently limited" is an 
efficacious example of the inherent unsuitability of defining aboriginal title, a sui generis 
interest, within the confines of the common law. 
The very fact that the Court classified aboriginal rights and title as sui generis interests 
signifies the need for an analysis independent of the common law property paradigm. 
However, the sui generis status of aboriginal rights and title should not be used as a justification 
to limit aboriginal title. As McNeil points out, if aboriginal title is based partly in its source in 
aboriginal law and custom, then "one would expect its content to be defined in terms of those 
laws and customs, which would have to be proved."77  This has the effect of limiting 
permissible uses of the land.  Therefore, future courts should avoid relying on the unique 
status of aboriginal title to create an interest that may be less than if examined under other 
paradigms.78  
Some commentators have suggested that had the Supreme Court not "pierced the veil of 
real property law" and instead analysed aboriginal title under common law concepts of 
                                                                                                                                                                        
cannot…surrender its rights by modifying its way of life. (Mabo  v State of Queensland above n 4, 150).  
Lamer CJ himself in R v Van Der Peet, suggesting that aboriginal rights can only be those activities that 
are "integral to the distinctive culture," stated this rule was not applicable to aboriginal title R v Van 
Der Peet above n 3, 320.  
77  "The Meaning of Aboriginal Title" above n 35, 141. 
78  "Piercing the Veil" above n 14. 
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property, the scope of aboriginal title would be significantly wider than actually determined. 
Flanagan argues that:79 
[a]lthough these common law principles may be "formalistic" and  "alien" to aboriginal cultures, 
these same principles would have arguably granted to the aboriginal claimants a larger interest in 
their lands than was ultimately granted by the Court in Delgamuukw.  
The problem with this suggestion it that it ignores the unique interest that is aboriginal title. 
Although the concept of aboriginal title is recognised by the common law, the two are 
inherently incompatible and it is misleading to define aboriginal title within such a foreign 
framework. If courts are to uphold the sui generis classification they have bestowed upon 
aboriginal title, then they ought to ignore real property law concepts, which only serve to 
confuse the issue. If this results in an unduly limited scope for aboriginal title, then courts may 
have to reassess their approach to aboriginal title claims.  Should they be struggling to 
determine the status of aboriginal title and how it fits, if at all, into the common law, or should 
they rather concentrate their efforts on creating equitable solutions that satisfy aboriginal 
claimants as well as the government?   
B Overseas Approaches to Aboriginal Title and the Common Law  
Unlike the Supreme Court of Canada, courts in other jurisdictions have not hesitated in 
defining aboriginal title within a common law property law framework. This is perhaps 
initiated by a desire to create for aboriginal claimants an interest equivalent to a Crown 
granted fee simple estate. However, these good intentions have muddied the waters 
surrounding the real meaning of aboriginal title. 
Contrary to the sentiments of the Canadian Supreme Court, several jurisdictions have 
described aboriginal title as entitling groups to "ownership" of the land, disregarding the 
meaning of this term at common law. At common law, "ownership" encompasses the broadest 
right of all to land, entitling the owner to use the land however he or she desires, (subject to 
resource management restrictions) and pass it on to to any successor they choose. Brennan J in 
Mabo believed the inalienability of aboriginal title did not preclude it from equating to 
"ownership".  He reasoned: 80 
  
79  "Piercing the Veil" above n 14, 323.  
80  Mabo v State of Queensland above n 4, 51 per Brennan J. This qualifies his earlier statement that "the 
nature and incidents of native title must be ascertained with reference as a matter of fact to those 
[traditional] laws and customs." (above n 4, 58.) 
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[w]hile it is true that Native title, unlike most estates in fee simple, is inalienable other than by 
surrender to the Crown….it would be wrong to point to the inalienability of land…to deny that the 
indigenous people owned their land….[t]he ownership of land within a territory in the exclusive 
occupation of a people must be vested in that people; land is susceptible of ownership, and there 
are no other owners. 
Other courts have expressed similar views, describing aboriginal title as "full beneficial 
ownership" of the land, allowing the title-holder to engage in any activity they desire upon the 
land.81 American courts in particular have held that aboriginal title "extends to exclusive use 
and enjoyment irrespective of the original nature of the attachment to the land."82  In 1823, 
Marshall CJ in Johnson v M'Intosh83 stated that "[the Indians] were admitted to be the rightful 
occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it 
according to their discretion."84 
Some courts have even used the terminology of  "fee simple" to describe the aboriginal 
interest in land. In 1835, the Court in Mitchel v United States85 described the aboriginal peoples' 
right of occupancy "as sacred as the fee-simple of the whites," and Toohey J in Mabo implied 
that native title is as good as a fee simple.86 These judgments were based on an overriding 
principle of equality, attempting to give aboriginal title "full respect" and equality with 
common law proprietary title-holders. This is a desirable principle to abide by, but in applying 
it to aboriginal title claims, the law has been further confused as to the applicability of common 
law notions to aboriginal title.     
  
81  Johnson v M'Intosh  (1823) 8 Wheat 543  and  Mitchel v United States (1835) 34 US (9 Pet) 711 in the 
United States, and Amodu Tijani v Secretary, Southern Nigeria above n 7, and Geita Sebea v Territory of 
Papua (1941) 67 CLR 544, from the Privy Council.  
82  Richard Bartlett "The Content of Aboriginal Title and Equality Before the Law" (1998) 61 Sask LR, 391. 
83  Johnson v M'Intosh above n 81. 
84  Johnson v M'Intosh above n 81, 574. Further at 574, Chief Justice Marshall qualified this by stating that 
aboriginal title was "necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired", although "the rights of the 
original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded." Richard Bartlett above n 82 interprets 
Marshall CJ's limitation extending only as far as was necessary to give the Crown sovereignty.    
85  Mitchel v United States above n 81. 
86  Mabo v State of Queensland above n 4. 
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Applying common law notions of property law to aboriginal title creates inconsistencies in 
the definition of the content of aboriginal title. Describing aboriginal title as a "fee simple 
estate" or the right of  "ownership" has created a false impression of aboriginal title as an 
absolute proprietary interest, to be used at the title-holder's discretion. It is acceptable, even 
desirable, to allow aboriginal title-holders some measure of self-determination as to how they 
will use their lands, but in doing so, the special nature of aboriginal title must not be ignored. 
By its very nature as an inalienable, sui generis interest, aboriginal title is unable to be a 
platform from which a freehold, fee simple interest equivalent to "ownership" can be created. It 
is not a title created by grant nor is it a common law tenure - its source is in historic occupation 
in accordance with customary laws, and accordingly, the uses for which it can be put can only 
be defined by those customs, albeit modified versions of them. 
V A NEW APPROACH 
A Aboriginal Title Claims in the Courts 
Kent McNeil has posed the question, "has the Supreme Court finally got it right?" The 
answer can only be an equivocal one. Yes and no. 
The Supreme Court comprehensively analysed the source and nature of aboriginal title, 
and established revolutionary guidelines for its proof, but erred on the issue of provincial 
jurisdiction to infringe or extinguish aboriginal title. In the end, the Supreme Court refused to 
address the substantive issues of whether aboriginal title and self-government had actually 
been made out, so after thirteen years of courtroom battles, massive expenditure and, 
undoubtedly, psychological exhaustion, the Indians remain where they began - empty-handed.  
What the case has proven is that courts are the wrong forum for aboriginal claims. The 
common law rules of evidence, although relaxed by the Supreme Court, are a significant 
hurdle for aboriginal claimants, and the adversarial nature of the judicial process is not 
favourable to such claims. Furthermore, the time and cost involved is often excessive, and 
wasted if a determination is never reached. The Court itself admitted it was not the appropriate 
forum for addressing aboriginal claims, instead recommending a process of negotiation where 
the two parties could consult with each other outside and decide on a solution without the 
constrictions of the common law.87 In short, the common law paradigm is unsuitable for 
  
87 Delgamuukw (SCC) above n 2, 284, per La Forest J. "The best approach in these types of cases is a 
process of negotiation and reconciliation that properly considers the complex and competing interests 
at stake."  
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assessing the content of a sui generis interest such as aboriginal title. A new approach is 
required for such claims.  
B New Paradigms for Resolving Aboriginal Claims 
The fundamental rights of the indigenous peoples, arising from their historic occupation of 
the land in accordance with customary laws, demand full respect. The economic advancement 
of the province through the exploitation of the rich natural resources on the land also deserves 
consideration. The only effective way of achieving an equilibrium between indigenous and 
private land rights is through consultation and co-operation via specially created commissions 
and negotiated treaty settlements. As Lamer CJC muses, "We are all here to stay."88 
Indigenous land claim settlements by treaty and legislation have become the most effective 
mechanism for resolving aboriginal claims. The Canadian government, like the governments of 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States, among others, has taken this administrative 
approach to resolving aboriginal claims, which has proven considerably more successful than 
litigation.89 Contrary to the legal process, the settlement process has "pro[ved] that 
accommodations between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples are possible."90  
In 1993, the federal government of Canada stated its intention to adhere to a policy of 
whereby:91 
comprehensive claims settlements are negotiated to clarify the rights of aboriginal groups to land 
and resources, in a manner that will facilitate their economic growth and contribute to the 
development of aboriginal self-government.  
In the same year, the province of British Columbia established the British Columbia Treaty 
Commission to facilitate a six-stage treaty-making process in the province to settle indigenous 
land claims. The agreement between the federal and provincial governments and the British 
  
88  Delgamuukw (SCC) above n 2, 273. 
89  For example, the Nisga'a accord, signed in 1996 yet awaiting ratification by the Canadian government, 
resolved 28 years of litigation (Calder v Attorney General of British Columbia above n 7). In 1999, the self-
governing Nuvunak territory was established in Northern Canada. This came about not through 
litigation, but as a result of  negotiated agreements and legislative actions.       
90  Ken Coates and Paul McHugh Living Relationships - Kokiri Ngatahi - The Treaty of Waitangi in the New 
Millennium  (VUW Press, Wellington, 1998) 41 [Living Relationships].   
91  Hon Tom Siddon, PC, MP Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. "Federal Policy for 
the Settlement of Native Claims" March 1993, quoted in Living Relationships above n 90, 130.  
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Columbia First Nations Summit to establish the Commission shows a commitment to "improve 
the relationship among parties."92  The Commission cannot make binding orders or 
determinations, similar to the Waitangi Tribunal in New Zealand, but has persuasive 
recommendatory powers. One can only speculate how the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en Indians 
would have fared had they chosen this avenue to resolve their claim. In the future, the Treaty 
Commission ought to be the starting point for any aboriginal claim in British Columbia.  
Although the usual treaty process involves extinguishing aboriginal title and making a 
Crown grant of land to Indians with full beneficial ownership rights, following Delgamuukw, 
First Nations have made a more radical statement to the Ministers under the first stage of the 
treaty process. They are demanding that there be no extinguishment of aboriginal title and that 
aboriginal rights that are granted equate to jurisdiction over the land. Whether these requests 
will be accepted is uncertain. What is clear, however, is that a negotiated treaty settlement 
process is the only means by which aboriginal groups can have their claims heard equitably.     
VI CONCLUSION 
After a long struggle, the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en's plea remains unanswered. The new 
trial ordered by the Supreme Court implies that the Delgamuukw case "will remain part of the 
judicial landscape for many years."93  
The Supreme Court's comments on aboriginal title are likely to form the basis for the 
pleadings at the new trial. If aboriginal title is found to exist on the evidence, which would be 
very likely, the application of the Supreme Court's test will still deny the Indians their end 
goal. They will not be able to use their lands like freehold owners. They must surrender their 
aboriginal title if their use of the land negatives the basis of their title. Simply, the limitation on 
their land uses will render them "prisoners of the past."94  
The court has tried to interpret a unique concept, that of aboriginal title, within the strict 
and conservative paradigm of the common law. The Delgamuukw case has proven that this 
model does not work. The only way to resolve the complex issues arising from aboriginal 
  
92  Living Relationships above n 90, 132. This was the aim stated by the Commission in their annual report 
in 1997. 
93  Tehan, above n 57,781. 
94  "Defining Aboriginal Rights in the 90s" above n 56, 12.  
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claims is through negotiated settlements, involving specially created commissions and 
legislative action.      
The judgment in Delgamuukw has "set the political stage for re-defining the fundamental 
relationship between the Canadian State and aboriginal peoples."95 Aboriginal groups can only 
go forward from here. The path they choose will determine their success.    
 
95  Anthropological Perspectives above n 70, 1.  
